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1. Introduction 
The number of children that parents desire is linked to other characteristics, such as their 
level of ambition in their careers, their lifestyle and the balance in their preferences for 
child “quality” and quantity. The desired number of children is one of the most important 
determinants of the achieved number of children, and the number of children in a family 
will therefore be related to, most often unobserved, characteristics of the parents that 
affect the life chances of both the children and the parents themselves. Therefore, studies 
investigating how the number of siblings affects the children or the number of children 
affects the parents face problems because the number of children in a family is endogenous 
in the model. Different methods have been used to find exogenous variation in the number 
of children, with instrumental variables (IVs) based on twin births being a well-known and 
widespread solution (see Clarke (2017) for an overview of the literature).  
IVs based on twin births have been considered a solution to problems of endogeneity 
because twin births occur at random and can therefore increase the number of children in 
the family exogenously, thereby creating a so-called natural experiment.1 The randomness 
allows us to assume that parents who do and do not experience a twin birth have similar 
characteristics (in large samples). Importantly, we can assume that parents who do and do 
not experience a twin birth, on average, desire the same number of children.  
IVs for the number of children based on twin births were initially proposed by 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin in two papers published in 1980, and they have been used in many 
studies since (Table 1). Rosenzweig and Wolpin explained that because the likelihood of 
experiencing any twin birth clearly increases with the number of births, it is necessary to 
standardize for the number of births. Their two 1980 publications used different 
specifications to achieve this standardization. They also used the IVs to study different 
types of outcomes. The methodological variation has since increased rather than decreased 
over time (Table 1). The different specifications of the IV imply different conceptual 
models of what is being estimated, and the different IVs are also more or less plausible as 
good instruments. 
                                                 
1 Or even a natural natural experiment because it is human biology that creates the 
situation (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), p. 829). 
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Because the likelihood of experiencing any twin birth, as noted above, clearly increases 
with the number of births, an indicator of whether the family has experienced any twin 
birth (as used in, e.g., Lu (2009), Braakmann and Wildman (2016), Shen, Zou, and Liu 
(2017), Nguyen and Tran (2017), and de Jong, Smits, and Longwe (2017)) is clearly not a 
valid instrument. The positive association between the instrument and the number of 
children will also make it positively associated with the desired number of children and, 
therefore, with other important confounding factors. For the same reason, versions of this 
specification, such as any twin birth as a second or subsequent birth (Frenette (2011a, 
2011b)) or any twin birth among younger siblings (Dasgupta and Solomon (2018)), will also 
not be valid.  
Some studies have also used a twin as the last birth as the instrument (de Haan (2010), 
Hatton and Martin (2010)). This instrument will also be associated with the desired number 
of children in two opposing directions. As always, the likelihood of experiencing a twin 
birth increases with the number of births. However, the likelihood of ending with a twin is 
simultaneously dependent on the number of children the parents want. Both parents who 
wanted as many children as they have with the twin birth and parents who would have 
preferred one instead of two more children stop having children with the twin birth.2 If 
parents want even more children, then they will also proceed to have another birth after 
the twin birth. As shown below, the net association between the instrument and the desired 
number of children will not always be strong in practice. It is still not a plausible 
instrument.  
In their 1980 paper published in Econometrica, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) used the 
share of twin births among all (completed) pregnancies as the instrument when studying 
how the schooling of children is affected by the number of siblings (This specification is 
used also in Dayioğlu, Kirdar, and Tansel (2009).). Naturally, the share of twin births will 
take on values within the same range regardless of the number of births. However, these 
values will have a different substantive meaning, and different values will be more or less 
common for different numbers of births. Interpreting the estimated effect will therefore be 
a challenge.  
                                                 
2 Consequently, ending with a twin birth is approximately 1.8-1.9 times as likely as it is 
to experience a twin birth at a specific birth (see the results in the Appendix).  
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In the paper published in the Journal of Political Economy, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1980a) used twins as the first birth as the instrument when studying how women’s labor 
force participation is affected by the number of children. Experiencing a twin birth as the 
first birth is an event that is as random as twin births ever are. However, how the parents 
behave after experiencing a twin birth or a single birth as the first birth is not random but 
determined by their desired number of children. This instrument will therefore be a poor 
predictor of the final number of children if it is common to desire two or more children. 
This issue will be discussed further below.  
A number of studies have clarified and refined the method for disassociating the 
instrument from the desired number of children. These studies use parity-specific twin 
births as the IV, for example, a twin birth as the second birth. The analysis is then 
conducted on a sample that includes families with at least that many births, for example, 
two or more births. These samples are therefore called n+ samples, where n is the parity 
used to define the instrument. In practice, this method allows only the impact of younger 
siblings to be studied. If, for example, we use a twin birth as the second birth as the IV, 
then we study how the first-born child is affected by having another younger sibling. Twins 
are mostly excluded from the analysis because of their special characteristics (e.g., 
Silventoinen et al. (2013)). In these cases, families that had a twin as the first birth are 
therefore also excluded from the analysis.  
The specification using parity-specific twin births was intimated in Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1980b), but it was further elaborated in Angrist and Evans (1998). The form of the 
specification was then found in Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Angrist, Lavy and 
Schlosser ((2005), (2010)), and Cáceras-Delpiano (2006). Using parity-specific twin births as 
the instrument in n+ samples has since been considered the “gold standard” method for 
investigating the effect of the number of children on siblings. Rather, it was considered the 
“gold standard” method until a number of critical papers recently emerged in the literature. 
IVs based on twin births are the most convincing when defined using parity-specific events 
and n+ samples, including twin as the first birth. Therefore, this type of specification is the 
specification that I discuss in this paper. I argue that despite its seeming robustness, it does 
not work because it violates several necessary assumptions.  
Twin births are rare events. This fact means that when we use IVs based on twin births, 
we can study only the effect of the number of children for a small group of families that 
may or may not be completely representative. The external validity of IVs in general and 
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IVs based on twin births in particular has been questioned by some (e.g., Moffitt (2005), 
Heckman (2010)). The strength of this method is its supposed high degree of internal 
validity (e.g., Imbens ((2010), (2014))). However, this internal validity has recently been 
called into question in a number of different studies (Bhalotra and Clarke (2016), 
Braakmann and Wildman (2016), Farbmacher, Guber, and Vikström (2018)). These studies 
show that violations of the necessary assumptions that are both plausible and mild lead to 
substantively important biases of the results. My paper contributes to this mounting 
critique and argues that there are even more serious issues related to the internal validity of 
IVs based on twin births. I argue that these IVs are by definition not valid and will produce 
ill-defined and biased results. 
Some of these biases can be predicted to work against finding any influence of the 
number of children on the outcome. These biases can therefore be contributing to the 
pattern in previous results of finding a negative association but no negative effect when 
using a twin birth IV (See, for example, Black, Devereux, and Salvanes ((2005), (2010)), 
Cáceres-Delpiano ((2006), (2012b)), Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010), Åslund and 
Grönqvist (2010), Marteleto and de Souza (2012), Ponczek and Souza (2012); Baranowska-
Rataj, Barclay, and Kolk (2017).). 
My discussion and critique of twin birth IVs are mostly based on arguments and 
definitions. I do not see any way to derive a formal proof that I am correct. Most likely, the 
reason is, in part, my lack of training: However, another reason why I make my argument 
mostly in verbal form is that this method does not work because of conceptual definitions. 
I think that previous applications have overlooked some of the problems with this method 
precisely because they have not written about it enough in words. It also seems as though 
many researchers applying this method or evaluating others’ applications of it do not fully 
understand this method. Some of them are people just like me who struggle to grasp the 
empirical implications of, for example, the assumptions that the covariance is equal to zero. 
Below, I try to explain the frameworks and methods that I use. Therefore, the text will 
come across as basic to some readers. Please feel free to skim or skip ahead if you are one 
of those readers. 
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TABLE 1. A METHODOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF RECENT USES OF TWIN BIRTHS AS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Reference Specification of the twin birth instrument 
Complete  
fertility history? 
Studying the 
effect on… 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a) Twin as first birth Not only complete families Mothers 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) Share of twin births Not only complete families Children 
Bronars and Grogger (1994) Twin as first birth Not only complete families Mothers 
Angrist and Evans (1998) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Mothers 
Jacobsen, Pearce III, and Rosenbloom (1999) Twin as first birth Not only complete families Mothers 
Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Cáceras-Delpiano (2006) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Children 
Glick, Marani, and Sahn (2007) Twin as first birth1 Not only complete families Children 
Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Children 
Lu (2009) Any twin birth Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Dayioğlu, Kirdar, and Tansel (2009) Share of twin births Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2010) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
de Haan (2010) Twin as last birth Not only complete families Children 
Hatton and Martin (2010) Twin as last birth Not only complete families Children 
Vere (2011) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Mothers 
Frenette (2011a) Twin as second or subsequent birth Not only complete families Parents 
Frenette (2011b) Twin as second or subsequent birth Not only complete families Children 
Cáceres-Delpiano (2012a) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Mothers and children 
Cáceres-Delpiano (2012b) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Mothers 
Marteleto and de Souza (2012) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Children 
Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Mothers 
Göteborg Papers in Economic History no. 23 
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Ponczek and Souza (2012) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Children 
Holmlund, Rainer, and Siedler (2013) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only complete families Parents and children 
Marteleto and de Souza (2013) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Children 
Kruk and Reinhold (2014) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only complete families Parents 
Kolk (2015) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only complete families Children 
Abdul-Razak, Abd Karim, and Abdul-Hakim (2015) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Not only complete families Children 
Braakmann and Wildman (2016) Any twin birth Not only complete families Mothers 
Baranowska-Rataj, de Luna, and Ivarsson (2016) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Silles (2016) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only complete families Mothers 
Mogstad and Wiswall (2016) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only complete families Children 
Oliveira (2016a) Twin as first birth Only complete families Parents and children 
Oliveira (2016b) Twin as first birth2 Not only complete families Mothers 
Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak (2016) Twin as first birth3 Not only complete families Mothers 
He and Zhu (2016) Twin as first birth4 Not only complete families Mothers 
Shen, Zou, and Liu (2017) Any twin birth Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Nguyen and Tran (2017) Any twin birth Not only complete families Mothers 
de Jong, Smits, and Longwe (2017) Any twin birth5 Not only complete families Mothers 
Bonner and Sarkar (2017) Being part of a twin birth Not only complete families Children 
Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only complete families Children 
Baranowska-Rataj, Barclay, and Kolk (2017) Parity-specific twin births and n+ samples Only (or mostly) complete families Children 
Zhang (2017) Parity-specific twin births and n+1 samples Not only complete families Mothers 
Arouri, Ben-Youssef, and Nguyen Viet (2017) Twin as first birth Not only complete families Parents 
Chen (2017) Twin birth in first two parities Not only complete families Children 
Dasgupta and Solomon (2018) Twins among the younger siblings Not only complete families Children 
Note: This summary is not an exhaustive overview of the literature.  
1 Including cases in which one of the twins had died. 2 The oldest resident children were of the same age. 3 Including also children born in the same year. 4 Any twin birth 
among mothers with one or two children. 5 Among children under 6 years old.
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2. A definition of what we are studying 
As always, we should, start with a clear definition of what we are studying. IVs based on 
twin births are used to study how parents are affected by their number of children and how 
children are affected by their number of siblings. The number of children/siblings, as noted 
above, is an endogenous explanatory variable in such a model, and IVs based on twin births 
are intended to provide exogenous variation.  
A benefit of studying people and families is that we can know something about the 
process through which children are born, i.e., how families behave, and we can use this 
knowledge to create a simplified model of the underlying process of what we study. My aim 
here is to formulate a simplistic but logical model of events and behaviors related to the 
birth of children, not to formulate a complete behavioral model. I argue that the simplistic 
model is a sufficiently accurate representation of reality and of the behaviors assumed when 
using twin births for IVs. Other behavioral assumptions underlying the use of twin births 
for IVs are discussed in, for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Rosenzweig and 
Zhang (2009). 
The starting point of the model is a population of prospective parents. These parents 
desire different numbers of children (but all desire at least one). These parents then proceed 
to become pregnant and give birth to either one, i.e., single birth, or two, i.e., twin birth, 
children. (Throughout the paper, for simplicity, I ignore higher-order multiple births.) They 
go on to do so until they have reached or, through a twin birth, surpassed their desired 
number of children. Figure 1 shows the possible sequences of single and twin births through 
which families desiring two or three children can reach or surpass their desired number of 
children. This simplistic model relies on a number of assumptions that are unlikely to be 
completely accurate; I discuss these assumptions further below. I argue that the model is 
nonetheless useful for discussing IVs based on twin births.  
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FIGURE 1. A FLOWCHART OF THE PROCESS OF HAVING CHILDREN 
 
 
I created a simulated population of parents with different birth sequences. To do so, I 
extended the model in Figure 1 so that families are allowed to desire 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 
children. In reality, few families will desire more than nine children and setting this 
maximum value limits the number of possible sequences in the data. Allowing the families in 
the simulation to desire between one and nine children leads to 230 different combinations 
of single and twin births that they can experience before they have all reached or surpassed 
their desired number of children. When we use a twin as the second birth as the IV, we 
focus on families with at least two births. All families therefore desire at least two children, 
i.e., between two and nine children. If we, as is most common, exclude the twins themselves 
from the analyses, then we also exclude families that have a twin as the first birth. This 
exclusion leads to 141 different possible combinations of single and twin births to reach or 
surpass the desired number of children.  
Each sequence has a probability of occurring. Sequence 1, for example, will have the 
probability ݌ଵ ൌ ൫1 െ ݌ሺݐݓ݅݊ሻ൯൫1 െ ݌ሺݐݓ݅݊ሻ൯, with ݌ሺݐݓ݅݊ሻ being the likelihood of a 
twin birth. The complete list of sequences and their respective probabilities is presented in a 
spreadsheet available as an Appendix. The probability of each sequence is determined by the 
Wanted 
children
Want: 2 children
Single
Birth 1
Twin
Stop
Birth 2
Stop
Single
Twin
Wanted 
children
Stop “Unwanted” child
Wanted 
children
Want: 3 children
Single
Birth 1
Twin
Birth 2
Single
Twin Stop Wanted children
Stop
Birth 2
Single
Twin Stop “Unwanted” child
Wanted 
childrenStopSingle
Stop “Unwanted” child
Birth 3
Twin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Sequence:
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likelihood of a twin birth. More importantly, however, which sequence a family follows is 
determined by the number of children that the family desires. 
The desired number of children is rarely observed empirically. When we use twin births 
as IVs, we also assume that parents have a fixed number of children that they desire 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b), p. 232; see also, e.g., Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
(2005), p. 681). This assumption might be unrealistic in real life, making it even more 
difficult to observe.  
I used the complete set of different possible combinations of twin and single births as 
well as their respective probabilities to create the simulated population of families. To do so, 
I also needed distributions of the desired number of children; thus, I used four different 
empirical distributions of the relative frequencies of families having different numbers of 
children. The four distributions cover different populations and time periods.3 I used these 
different distributions of realized numbers of children as proxies for hypothetical 
distributions of the desired numbers of children. This method is not a perfect solution, but 
it allows me to investigate how the twin birth IVs are affected by changes in the behavior 
and preferences of populations.  
I make the following assumptions in the model creating the simulated population of birth 
histories: 
 Everyone can and will reach (or surpass) their desired number of children. In 
other words, there is no involuntary childlessness, infertility, or other 
limitations on fertility decisions.  
 Parents have, ex ante, a fixed number of children that they want. This 
assumption also implies that all parent couples stay together or, at least, that 
                                                 
3 Sweden, people born 1972-1979: Åslund and Grönqvist (2010), the distribution is 
presented in Table 1; Norway, average year of birth 1962: Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
(2005), Table II; Saint Paul, MN, USA, children aged 0-17 years in 1920: Roberts and 
Warren (2017), Table 3; The Netherlands, men born 1944-1947: Stradford, van Poppel, and 
Lumey (2017), Table 1.  
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the parent couples also have the same desired number of children after one 
of the partners in a couple changes.  
 All parents are willing to risk surpassing their desired number of children to 
reach their desired number. 
 There are no unintended pregnancies, and therefore, there can be no 
“unwanted” single births.  
 Twin births occur completely at random with a constant probability  
(p = 0.0175).  
 Multiple births occur only as twin births.  
 The timing and spacing of births have no effects on the children or the 
parents. 
 There is no effect of birth order on the outcome.  
 
These assumptions are all wrong. There are widespread problems with involuntary 
childlessness and infertility worldwide (Gurunath et al. (2011), Mascarenhas et al. (2012)). 
Fertility preferences are complex and are dynamically influenced by a large number of 
different factors (Bachrach and Morgan (2013), Philipov, Liefbroer, and Klobas (2015)). 
There are many unintended pregnancies in populations all over the world (Singh, Sedge, and 
Hussain (2010), Alkema et al. (2013)). Twin births do not occur completely at random, at 
least not dizygotic twin births (Bhalotra and Clarke (2016); Braakmann and Wildman (2016); 
Farbmacher, Guber, and Vikström (2018)). The timing (Gipson, Koenig, and Hindin (2008), 
Hall et al. (2017)) and the spacing of births (Conde-Agudelo et al. (2012), Kozuki et al. 
(2013)) can be expected to have a number of different effects on both the children and the 
parents (see also Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009). Several previous studies have found effects 
of birth order (e.g., Myrskylä et al. (2013), Jayachandran and Pande (2017)). The linear 
specification, assuming no differences in effects between parities, has recently been shown 
not to work well when we investigate how children are affected by their number of siblings 
(Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), Guo, Yi, and Zhang (2017)). 
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I still make these assumptions, despite knowing that they are not actually accurate, to 
preserve the clarity of the model and to avoid tangential issues. Realistic processes for 
determining the fertility preferences of parents and the birth of a child would change my 
deterministic, probability-weighted outcomes into probabilistic outcomes. The strong 
assumption regarding parents having a fixed desired number of children is made implicitly  
in all studies using twin births as IVs and was used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin ((1980b), e.g., 
p. 232) in their original derivation of the method. I maintain the assumption that twin births 
occur completely at random for clarity and to show that the issues that I raise here are 
independent of the issues raised by Bhalotra and Clarke (2016), Braakmann and Wildman 
(2016), and Farbmacher, Guber, and Vikström (2018). The strong assumption that neither 
parents nor children are affected by the timing and spacing of births is made in almost all 
studies using twin birth IVs (but see Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)). 
I discuss twin birth IVs as applied to studies of how children are affected by their 
number of siblings. IVs based on twin births have been used as a solution to problems of 
endogeneity in a large number of studies investigating this topic (Table 1). Many of these 
studies try to test Becker’s proposition that parents make trade-offs between the quantity 
and “quality” of their children, i.e., how many children to have and how much to invest in 
each (Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker and Tomes (1976)). I find it useful to summarize my 
thinking in a mind map, and therefore, Figure 2 provides a graphical summary of an example 
of a model for investigating this issue.4 It shows how the estimated effect of the number of 
siblings will be biased through confounding from, in this case, the parents’ socioeconomic 
                                                 
4 Judea Pearl argues for the usefulness of graphical representations of models in the form 
of directed acyclical graphs (DAGs, see Pearl, Glymour, and Jewell (2016) for an 
introduction). He and many others have also developed tools for estimating effects and 
testing the implications of the graphical models. I will not apply any of these tools here but, 
rather, evaluate twin birth IVs in the framework of potential outcomes (primarily following 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) and Imbens and Rubin (2015)) because that is the 
framework that has been used in a number of influential publications for the twin birth IV 
literature (especially Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010)).  
Göteborg Papers in Economic History no. 23 
 
 
 
 
12
status, the presence of “unwanted” children, and the parents’ preferences for “child quality”. 
Most often, we can adjust our estimates for the parents’ socioeconomic status. However, we 
seldom have information on the presence of “unwanted” children. In addition, the parents’ 
preferences for “child quality” is almost always impossible to measure. The model in Figure 
2 therefore shows one example of why and how the number of siblings becomes an 
endogenous variable in the model.  
FIGURE 2. A GRAPHICAL SUMMARY OF A MODEL FOR INVESTIGATING HOW THE NUMBER OF 
SIBLINGS AFFECTS THE OUTCOME OF A CHILD 
 
 
I use a simplified version of the model in Figure 2 for my illustrations of how and why 
IVs based on twin births do not work as intended. I model the influence of the number of 
siblings on children using a linear model with additive effects. The linear specification and 
the corresponding assumption of constant effects across parities have recently been shown 
not to work well for this application (Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), Guo, Yi, and Zhang 
(2017)). This finding is a serious and important critique of previous literature; nonetheless, I 
use a linear model to preserve clarity. For the same reason, I sometimes assume that there 
are no other variables that we must include to adjust the model.  
The model that I use includes the number of siblings, ܰ, the number of “unwanted” 
children in the family, ܷ, the parents’ socioeconomic status, ܵ, and their preference for child 
“quality”, ܳ∗, as influences on the outcome for the child, ܻ.  
Parents’ socioeconomic status
Parents’ preferences
for ”child quality”
End with
twin birth
Parents’ desired number of children
Number of
twin births
Number of births
Number of siblings
Outcome for child
”Unwanted” 
child
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The number of siblings, ܰ, is the variable of interest, the “treatment” of which we want 
to estimate the effect. We apply IVs when investigating the effect of the number of children 
because we do not think that the effect of having another child is the same for everyone, i.e., 
that intended and unintended children will be associated with different outcomes for 
children. It is therefore reasonable to include a separate factor for the potential presence of 
“unwanted” children in the family in the model of the outcome and to include the possible 
presence of an “unwanted” child as a separate influence on the outcome.  
The resources available to parents will affect both the opportunities to have children and 
the opportunities to invest in them. We summarize these resources as the parents’ 
socioeconomic status, ܵ, which is therefore a factor for which we should and, most often, 
can adjust our models. However, it is important to remember that our empirical variables—
for example, the parents’ educational level, occupational status or income—will never be 
able to fully capture all aspects or resources summarized as the parents’ “socioeconomic 
status”. There will therefore be a measurement error in the empirical variable, which, in turn, 
will lead to residual confounding from the parents’ socioeconomic status.5  
Parents will also have different preferences regarding how to rear children and, for 
example, be more or less focused on optimizing the development of the child in different 
aspects. These preferences will vary across different aspects of parenting. The confounding 
from ܳ∗ will therefore also be different for different outcomes. However, ideally, we would 
like to adjust our estimates for the relevant preferences. The model would therefore be as 
follows:  
ࢅ ൌ ࢻ૚ ൅ ࢼࡺ ൅ ࣆ૚ࢁ ൅ ࢾ૚ࡿ ൅ ࣋૚ࡽ∗   (1) 
The number of siblings, ܰ, must be instrumented to obtain an unbiased estimate of its 
effect on the outcome, ߚ. Self-evidently, I use an IV based on twin births. The model of the 
number of siblings includes the twin instrument, ܼ, and the parents’ socioeconomic status, 
ܵ. In addition to these variables, we would like to include the parents’ desired number of 
                                                 
5 Measurement errors will also contribute to the fact that we cannot know whether we 
are recovering the true causal effect even if our model is, in theory, correctly specified. 
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children, ܰ∗, because this is one of the best predictors for the realized number of children 
(e.g., Schoen et al. (1999), Philipov, Liefbroer, and Klobas (2015), e.g., p. 168).6 The 
following, then, is the model that is estimated in the first-stage regression: 
ࡺ ൌ ࢻ૛ ൅ ࢼࡲࡿࢆ ൅ ࢾ૛ࡿ ൅ ࣁ૛ࡺ∗	  (2a) 
The preceding paragraphs have presented the definition of the research question, the 
model for investigating it and the data to be used. In the next section, I discuss the 
conceptual model that allows us to claim that the model estimates causal effects.  
3. The counterfactual or potential outcomes framework for causal analyses 
To estimate a causal effect, we must define it conceptually. There is a sometimes 
unrecognized distinction between defining and estimating the causal effect in which one is 
interested  
(e.g., Holland (1986), Heckman (2005), p. 50, Imbens and Rubin (2015), chap. 1). There are 
different possible ways to discuss and define the causal effect that we want to estimate. I use 
the potential outcomes, or counterfactual, framework (Imbens and Rubin (2015), Morgan 
and Winship (2015)). 
There is no single framework that is suitable for answering all types of scientific 
questions (e.g., Heckman (2005, 2010), Imbens (2010), Krieger and Davey Smith 
(2016)). How children and parents are affected by the number of children in the family is a 
substantive policy question with relevance for scientific theories that are of the type “effect 
of causes”. They can therefore be successfully analyzed using the potential outcomes 
framework (Holland (1986), see also Heckman (2010), p. 361).  
The potential outcomes framework conceptualizes the estimation of a causal effect in 
terms of a designed experiment. This conceptualization does not mean that the framework 
is valid only for experiments. The arguments are applicable to all attempts to estimate causal 
effects, including in social sciences in which experiments are frequently impossible or 
                                                 
6 I remind the reader that I use a highly stylized model of fertility behaviors allowing 
parents only to reach or surpass their desired number of children. Twin births can lead them 
to surpass their desired number of children, thus causing the birth of an “unwanted” child. 
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unethical. Conceptualizing the model as an experiment is useful for highlighting the often 
implicit assumptions made when we estimate causal effects.  
Using the experimental terminology, we estimate the effect of a “treatment”, ܹ, on the 
outcome, ܻ. The treatment must be something that we can, at least hypothetically, think of 
as being assigned as a treatment in an experiment. This criterion is one of the reasons why 
this framework is not suitable for all types of research questions. The treatment in the twin 
birth IV case is the number of children. The causal effect in the potential outcomes 
framework is defined as the difference between two potential outcomes defined for the 
same unit. In the twin birth IV case, the implication is that we compare the outcome for the 
child after varying the treatment, that is, the number of children. We can have one 
observation on the family and the fate of the child, which, following the notation in Imbens 
and Rubin (2015), is as follows: ௜ܻ௢௕௦ ൌ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܹሻ. This observation is then compared with 
how the child would have fared with a different, for example, larger, number of siblings, 
௜ܻ௠௜௦ ൌ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܹᇱሻ. Because in this comparison the same family and child are studied in two 
situations (of which one is hypothetical), everything except the number of children is kept 
constant. The effect of increasing the number of children on the outcome, meaning 
௜ܹᇱ ൐ ௜ܹ , is therefore  
௜ܻ௠௜௦ െ ௜ܻ௢௕௦.  
This discussion is easily extended to include an IV for the treatment. Again 
conceptualizing it as an experiment, the treatment is divided into two parts, the assignment 
to treatment—the instrument—and the receipt of treatment—the treatment of interest 
(Imbens and Rubin (2015), p. 513). In the words of Angrist and Pischke ((2015), p. 120), 
“The IV causal chain begins with random assignment to treatment, runs through treatment 
delivered, and ultimately affects outcomes”. We use IVs when there are reasons to believe 
that the units receiving treatment are systematically different from other units in 
unobservable ways. The IV, or assignment to treatment, should not be affected by this 
(unobservable) confounding and can therefore isolate exogenous variation in the receipt of 
treatment. In the twin birth IV case, the (supposedly) randomly occurring twin births 
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constitute the assignment mechanism creating exogenous variation in the receipt of 
treatment, the number of children. 
In observational data, we can seldom expect that the effect of the instrument on the 
treatment is the same for everyone. The effect of the treatment on the outcome will also 
vary. Furthermore, it is most likely the case that the treatment is not unique to those 
indicated by the instrument. In such common situations, we must include both the 
instrument and the treatment in the definition of the potential outcome. The potential 
outcome is then ௜ܻ൫ܼ௜, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ሻ൯, with ܼ௜ indicating the level of the instrument and ௜ܹሺܼ௜ሻ 
the level of the treatment at that value for the instrument. Naturally, the causal effect of 
interest remains the effect of the treatment, ܹ, on the outcome, ܻ. However, to estimate 
the effect, we use only the variation in the treatment that is being caused by the instrument, 
ܹሺܼሻ. 
We can never estimate the causal effect based on the unit-specific potential outcomes. 
One of these outcomes will always be merely a potential, unobservable outcome. For this 
reason, “the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference” is missing data (Holland (1986), p. 
947).  
We are forced to find other units that are comparable and that have different values of their 
treatment and outcomes, which is what we do when we change the definition of the causal 
effect to estimate it from populations. We need some additional assumptions to hold to 
make this change. Our estimates of this causal effect will be accurate only if the units that we 
choose to compare are truly comparable.  
4. Estimating the causal effect using an instrumental variable 
To be able to estimate any causal effect, we must make a number of assumptions (e.g., 
Holland (1986), Heckman (2005, 2010), Imbens and Rubin (2015)); to estimate causal effects 
using IVs, we must make assumptions regarding both the instrument(s) and the effect of 
interest.  
What assumptions are needed depends on what we can assume about the model that we 
estimate. Angrist and Evans ((1998), p. 458) suggest that we estimate a so-called local 
average treatment effect (LATE) when we use IVs based on twin births. The LATE is a 
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causal effect of treatment for a subset of the population, which was introduced by Imbens 
and Angrist (1994) and further elaborated in Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Angrist, 
Imbens and Rubin (1996).7 The advantage of the LATE is that, given a set of assumptions 
and requirements, we can estimate a causal effect even if there is systematic sorting, i.e., self-
selection, into treatment. (Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006), p. 391, call this 
phenomenon “essential heterogeneity”.) After Angrist and Pischke ((2008), p. 160–161) and 
Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser ((2005), (2010)) also suggested this interpretation in the twin 
birth IV case, it has been adopted by some other studies.8  
Interpreting the estimated effect as a LATE enables us to allow for both heterogeneous 
treatment effects and variation in the effect of the instrument on the treatment. More 
importantly, we can also allow for systematic sorting into treatment. Doing so comes at  
the cost of requiring an additional assumption of the instrument, so-called monotonicity, 
and a stricter version of the exclusion restriction (see, e.g., Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil 
(2006), p. 391).  
Regarding the instrument(s), we need it to be: 
 relevant, i.e., have a substantial influence on the instrumented variable.9 
 affecting the level of the instrumented variable in only one direction, i.e., 
monotonicity.10 
                                                 
7 For introductions, see Imbens and Rubin (2015), chap. 23–24; Morgan and Winship 
(2015), chap. 9. 
8 Other studies interpreting the estimated effect as a LATE include Cáceres-Delpiano 
(2006, 2012b), Åslund and Grönqvist (2010), Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012), 
Baranowska-Rataj, de Luna, and Ivarsson (2016), Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak (2016), 
Braakmann and Wildman (2016), Silles (2016), and Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017). 
The other studies in the literature have implicitly assumed homogenous treatment effects.  
9 The assumption is made using different wordings in different sources, for example, 
“Nonzero Average Causal Effect of Z on D” (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), p. 447), 
“First stage” (Angrist and Pischke (2008), p. 155), and “First-stage (population of compliers 
have positive probability)” (Henderson et al. (2008), p. 172). 
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 randomly assigned, which is also called the assumption of independence.11 
 affecting the outcome only through its effect on the treatment, the exclusion 
restriction.12 
If we must include other variables to adjust our models, we also must assume that these 
variables have: 
 overlapping distributions in the groups indicated by the instrument or not.13 
Regarding the effect of interest, we need it to fulfill: 
 the two parts of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVAs I and 
II).14 
 
When both the IV and the model fulfill all these necessary assumptions, we can estimate 
the causal effect, the LATE. The most common method of doing so is a two-stage least 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 There is more agreement on the term monotonicity (e.g., Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 
(1996), p. 447, Angrist and Pischke (2008), p. 154, Henderson et al. (2008), p. 172, Imbens 
and Rubin (2015), p. 551, Swanson and Hernán (2017)), even if Heckman, Urzua and 
Vytlacil ((2006), pp. 391–392) suggest the term “uniformity”.  
11 “Random assignment” (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), p. 446), “independence” 
(Angrist and Pischke (2008), p. 152), and “unconfounded type” (Henderson et al. (2008),  
p. 171). 
12 “Exclusion restriction” (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), p. 447, Angrist and Pischke 
(2008), p. 153) or “Mean independence within subpopulations” (Henderson et al. (2008),  
p. 171). 
13 As noted by Henderson et al. ((2008), p. 172). 
14 See, e.g., Cox ((1958), pp. 17–21), Rubin ((1990), p. 475), and Imbens and Rubin 
((2015), pp. 9–12), see also Heckman ((2005), pp. 11–12, 35–36, 43). Small et al. ((2017),  
p. 562) also write about this issue such that there should be “no unrepresented versions of 
the IV”. The first part of the SUTVA is sometimes discussed such that there should be no 
“equilibrium effects” (Heckman (2005), p. 11).  
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squares regression. This method consists of two parts or “stages” or “reduced form” 
models: one, the first stage, in which we estimate the causal effect of the instrument on the 
treatment, ߚ୊ୗ, and two, the second stage, in which we estimate the causal effect of the 
treatment on the outcome.  
If we do not need to adjust the model for any other variables, then we can also estimate 
the causal effect using the Wald estimator (Angrist and Pischke (2008), chap. 4, see also 
Imbens and Rubin (2015), chap. 23). In these cases, the second stage is the estimation of the 
causal effect of the instrument on the outcome, ߚୗୗᇱ . A plausible instrument is not related to 
the outcome other than through its effect on the treatment. The effect of the instrument on 
the outcome is therefore the result solely of the differences in the level of the treatment 
between those indicated by the instrument and not. Thus, the Wald estimate of the causal 
effect of the treatment on the outcome is the ratio of the effect of the instrument on the 
outcome divided by the effect of the instrument on the treatment, ߚመௐ௔௟ௗ ൌ ߚୗୗᇱ ߚ୊ୗ⁄ .  
The Wald estimator is important because it is easily comprehensible and therefore provides 
a way to gain an intuitive understanding of what is occurring when we use IVs.   
In practice, we most often want to include other variables to adjust our model. The 
purpose of including other variables in the first stage is to estimate the causal effect of the 
instrument on the treatment. To do so, we must remove all confounding from other factors. 
We then use the predicted value for the endogenous variable from the first-stage model, ෡ܰ, 
instead of the original values in the model of the outcome. These predicted values are a 
linear combination of the variables we use to adjust our first-stage model and the unique 
variation added by the instrument.  
ܻ ൌ ߙଷ ൅ ߚୗୗ ෡ܰ ൅ ߤଷܷ ൅ ߜଷܵ ൅ ߩଷܳ∗  (3a) 
We can estimate the two stages using ordinary least squares. We rely on the usual 
assumptions needed for this method, importantly, for example, that the instrument is not 
associated with the error terms. In most cases, the model that we estimate in the regression 
will deviate from the theoretical model with which we commence. Some factors will be 
unobserved or unobservable. We will, for example, almost never have empirical information 
on how many children the parents desired, and therefore, we will also not have information 
on whether a child birth was “unwanted” or what the parents’ preferences are regarding the 
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quantity and “quality” of children. These factors, as well as many others, end up in the error 
term because they are not included in the empirical model. The empirical versions of the 
first-and second-stage models that we end up estimating are the following: 
௜ܰ ൌ αଶ ൅ ߚ୊ୗZ௜ ൅ δଶS௜ ൅ ߝଶ,௜  (2b) 
ߝଶ,௜ ൌ aଶ ൅ ߟଶ ௜ܰ∗ ൅ eଶ,௜ (4) 
௜ܻ ൌ ߙଷ ൅ ߚୗୗ ෡ܰ௜ ൅ ߜଷ ௜ܵ ൅ ߝଷ,௜  (3b) 
ߝଷ,௜ ൌ aଷ ൅ ߩଷܳ௜∗ ൅ ߤଷ ௜ܷ ൅ eଷ,௜ (5) 
The error terms, ߝଶ,௜ and ߝଶ,௜, consist of both the unobserved factors and stochastic error 
terms, eଶ,௜ and eଷ,௜. The instrument must be independent of the error term, ߝଶ,௜, after 
conditioning on the included variables. Otherwise, our first-stage coefficient, ߚ୊ୗ, will be 
biased. It must also be independent of the error term in the model of the outcome, ߝଷ,௜, or 
the estimated causal effect will be biased. In the models outlined above, the implication is 
that there cannot be systematic differences in the desired number of children or the parents’ 
preferences for child “quality” between families that do and do not experience a parity-
specific twin birth. They also should not be any more or less likely to have an “unwanted” 
child if one experiences a parity-specific twin birth. This last part will be difficult to achieve 
if twin births actually increase the number of children exogenously in some families.   
5. Evaluating IVs based on twin births 
5.1. The effect of twin births on the number of children in the family 
Twin births lead to two children being born at once, in contrast to the one child born in a 
single birth. Twin births therefore lead to an unexpected (or, at least unexpected until the 
first ultrasound during the pregnancy) increase in the number of children in the family. We 
use IVs based on twin births because we think that they can create exogenous variation in 
the number of children. This exogenous variation in the number of children is necessary to 
be able to estimate its causal effect on the parent(s) (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a)) or the 
children (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b)). For this estimation to occur, the twin birth must 
lead to a both unexpected and unintended increase in the number of children. The (parity-
specific) twin birth will therefore create exogenous variation in the number of children only 
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when combined with a specific desired number of children, which will consequently occur 
only in some families. Some families will always have intended to have (at least) one more 
child. For them, the twin birth only leads to them having this intended increase in their 
number of children faster than expected. To use twin births as a source of exogenous 
variation in the number of children, it is therefore not enough that the twin births lead to an 
increase in the number of children born at a specific parity in families that experience a twin 
birth.  
5.1.1. A “timing failure” 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a) add the important insight that a twin birth will have 
different consequences for the number of children in the family depending on how much 
time has passed since the birth. A twin birth will lead to an exogenous increase in the 
number of children for some families, but it will lead to a “timing failure” for all “since two 
children appear simultaneously” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a), p. 338). The twin birth 
will affect the final, realized number of children in the family only if the parents have one 
more child than intended because of the twin birth. However, the timing failure will give 
parents who experience a twin birth a head start even among parents who wanted at least as 
many children as they had through the twin birth. Parents who experience a twin birth will 
therefore have a larger number of children than other parents, at least for a while. However, 
some or most of this difference will vanish if other parents are given time to catch up. The 
effect of a twin birth on the number of children will therefore depend on whether we are 
studying only “complete families”, which have all reached (or surpassed) their desired 
number of children, or also include other families, here called “incomplete families”.  
It has been more common in the literature studying the effect of the number of children 
on the mothers’ labor force participation to recognize that the effect of a multiple birth will 
vary (decline) over time (e.g., Bronars and Grogger (1994), p. 1143, Jacobsen, Pearce III, and 
Rosenbloom (1999), p. 456, Vere 2011; Braakmann and Wildman 2016). The “timing effect” 
is less well recognized in the literature studying the effects of their number of siblings on 
children (but see, e.g., Cáceres-Delpiano (2006), p. 749–751fn13). When we use twin births 
as IVs for the number of children, we, as always for IVs, assume that there is nothing else 
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associated with a twin birth that is affecting the outcome other than the fact that the families 
that experience a twin birth have more children than those that do not. Included in this 
assumption is that it makes no difference to the children if they have two siblings being born 
at once instead of with some time in between; in other words, “timing” should not matter. 
Provided that we study incomplete families, some of the difference in the number of 
children between families that do and do not experience a twin birth will be due to the 
timing effect. We assume that the timing has no effect on the outcome. The only thing that 
should create differences in the outcome is the difference in the final number of children 
created by the twin birth, i.e., the difference among complete families. When we include 
incomplete families, we will therefore dilute the causal effect on the outcome by 
overestimating the difference in the number of children in the first stage. When we use twin 
birth IVs in samples including incomplete families, the effect will therefore be biased toward 
zero provided that the assumptions hold. This fact has to date been overlooked in the 
literature using IVs based on twin births. If the assumption does not hold—if, for example, 
there are effects of the timing on the outcome—then we are not estimating the effect of the 
number of children but a sample-specific effect that is not well defined.  
5.1.2. First-stage coefficients 
The effect of a twin birth on the number of children is estimated by the coefficient on the 
instrument in the first-stage regression. More specifically, we estimate the effect of 
experiencing a twin birth at the parity we use to define our instrument. The size of the effect 
will depend on which parity we are studying and the distribution of the desired number of 
children in the population. As discussed above, it will also depend on whether we are 
studying only complete families or not. The results in Table 2 illustrate these influences on 
the first-stage coefficient.  
The coefficients in Table 2 were estimated on my simulated population of families. As 
noted above, these families, are assumed to desire different numbers of children, with a 
relative distribution following the distributions in four different empirical populations. They 
then experience different combinations of twin and single births until they reach or surpass 
their desired number of children. The regressions are estimated across the 230 or 141 
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different combinations that are possible when using different versions of the IV. These 
observations are weighted by a combination of their probabilities and the likelihood that a 
family desired that many children. I simulated the effect of including incomplete families by 
reducing the realized number of children for families with many children (that therefore also 
desired many children).15 
The results in Table 2 show that IVs based on twin births are poor predictors of the 
number of children in the family even though they are always associated with a substantial 
difference in the number of children, i.e., a sizable first-stage coefficient. All versions of the 
instrument explain a miniscule amount of the variation in all populations. It is also only the 
coefficients for the any-twin-birth instrument that are statistically significant. All t-values are 
far from Staiger and Stock’s (1997) often cited rule-of-thumb value of ten that is used to 
indicate that the instrument is not “weak”.16 The statistical significance of the first-stage 
coefficients in empirical applications of IVs based on twin births is therefore mostly a result 
of the sample size. The inclusion of incomplete families in the analyses will also contribute 
to increasing both the size of the first-stage coefficient and its level of statistical significance.i 
The increase in the size of the coefficient is exemplified in Table 2 by relating the difference 
to the true value estimated from only complete families. The bias varies in size depending on 
both the version of the instrument and the population studied. It is therefore difficult to 
predict how severe the bias will be in the many studies that have included incomplete 
families in their analyses. The bias is positive, meaning an overestimated first-stage 
coefficient, in all cases but one. We can therefore conclude that almost all these studies will 
underestimate any causal effect of the number of children. 
                                                 
15 I tried to simulate cutting some fertility histories short by reducing the realized number 
of children by more for families having (and therefore desiring) a larger number of children. 
I made the following changes in the realized number of children: 54; 65; 75; 86; 
96; 107. Families with four children or fewer were left unchanged.  
16 For a definition of weak IVs and the problems they create, see, for example, Staiger 
and Stock (1997), Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) and Murray (2006). 
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TABLE 2. THE SIZE AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIRST-STAGE COEFFICIENTS FOR DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES BASED ON TWIN BIRTHS ACROSS FOUR DIFFERENT POPULATIONS 
Distribution of desired 
number of children based 
on… Instrument 
Complete families Incomplete families 
N 
b complete t complete R2complete b incomplete t incomplete bias (%) 
Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
(2005) 
Twin as first birth 0.080 0.1243 0.00007 0.172 0.3453 +53.5 230 
Twin as second birth 0.379 0.5015 0.00181 0.493 0.9354 +23.1 141 
Twin as last birth 0.543 1.1226 0.00550 0.625 1.6784 +13.1 230 
Share twin births 1.217 1.0226 0.00457 1.438 1.5704 +15.4 230 
Any twin birth 0.797 1.9050 0.01567 0.814 2.5341 +2.1 230 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 
Twin as first birth 0.018 0.0284 0.000004 0.108 0.2287 +83.3 230 
Twin as second birth 0.402 0.5366 0.00207 0.506 0.9667 +20.6 141 
Twin as last birth 0.480 1.0404 0.00473 0.561 1.6205 +14.4 230 
Share twin births 1.053 0.9213 0.00371 1.275 1.4841 +17.4 230 
Any twin birth 0.735 1.8449 0.01471 0.746 2.4990 +1.5 230 
Stradford, van Poppel, and 
Lumey (2017) 
Twin as first birth –0.109 –0.0951 0.00004 0.048 0.0675 —— 230 
Twin as second birth 0.009 0.0066 0.0000003 0.177 0.2136 +94.9 141 
Twin as last birth 0.354 0.4250 0.00079 0.426 0.8303 +16.9 230 
Share twin births 0.866 0.3596 0.00057 1.239 0.8356 +30.1 230 
Any twin birth 1.226 2.1662 0.02017 0.881 2.5354 –39.2 230 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 
Twin as first birth 0.017 0.0177 0.000001 0.150 0.2245 +88.7 230 
Twin as second birth 0.167 0.1435 0.00015 0.327 0.4450 +48.9 141 
Twin as last birth 0.513 0.7054 0.00218 0.589 1.1810 +12.9 230 
Share twin births 1.314 0.6924 0.00210 1.575 1.2096 +16.6 230 
Any twin birth 1.214 2.1751 0.02033 1.010 2.6447 +20.2 230 
Note: The bias was calculated as 100 ൈ ൫ܾ௜௡௖௢௠௣௟௘௧௘ െ ܾ௖௢௠௣௟௘௧௘൯ ܾ௖௢௠௣௟௘௧௘ൗ . This measure is not meaningful for the one case where the coefficient changes 
sign. 
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As shown in Table 2, the size of the coefficient will depend on the parity and population 
studied but will always have the same substantive interpretation. If, for example, we use a 
twin birth as the second birth as the instrument, then the first-stage coefficient is the 
difference between the probability of having a third child when experiencing a twin birth as 
the second birth (probability equal to one) and the probability of having a third child when 
not experiencing a twin birth as the second birth (compare with Angrist and Pischke (2015), 
p. 128, see also p. 118). The probability of having a third child when not experiencing a twin 
birth as the second birth depends on the distribution of the desired number of children in 
the population. In other words, the difference between the two probabilities, i.e., the first-
stage coefficient, is therefore the share of families that desired two children but had three 
because of the twin birth. The first-stage coefficient is seldom interpreted in studies applying 
this method. However, Angrist and Pischke (2008, 2015) have discussed the results in 
Angrist and Evans (1998) and Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010). Their interpretation is the 
same as that which I have just presented.ii  
Even if the results are not always interpreted, most studies report the results from the 
first-stage regression. The first-stage coefficient on the twin birth IV is approximately 0.7–
0.8 in most present-day populations (Bhalotra and Clarke (2016), p. 35). That the coefficient 
is smaller than one illustrates that twin births lead only to an exogenous increase in the 
number of children in some families. We know that the coefficient must be below one in all 
reasonable applications of the method. There should be nothing, except the twin birth, that 
makes families that experience a (parity-specific) twin birth systematically different from 
other families. If this assumption—the exclusion restriction—is correct, then the largest 
possible difference in the number of children between families that do and do not 
experience a (parity-specific) twin birth is one. A coefficient of one would mean that all twin 
births (at the studied parity) result in unintended, “unwanted” births. 
5.1.3. Monotonicity, only in one direction 
The number of children will almost always be larger in families indicated by the twin birth 
IVs compared to those not indicated (Table 2). The average net effect will therefore be 
positive. However, the monotonicity assumption requires that the effect be positive for 
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everyone. There should be no parents who change their mind about wanting children when 
they have a singleton instead of a twin birth or parents whose fertility preferences are 
fundamentally changed when they experience a twin birth. The former group is not very 
likely even if an early death of one twin could result in a similar situation. The latter group is 
less unlikely, but it is difficult to evaluate how common this reaction is. The estimated effect 
does not have any well-defined causal interpretation if there are such exceptions in the 
population (Morgan and Winship (2015), chap. 9). However, de Chaisemartin (2017) has 
recently proposed a new set of assumptions that can be added to proceed with an analysis 
when it is likely that there are families that deviate from the expected reaction to twin and 
single births. Small et al. (2017) also recently introduced a new type of causal effect that can 
be estimated despite a presence of defiers. In conclusion, it is not unlikely that there are 
violations of the monotonicity assumption in the case of IVs based on twin birth, but these 
groups of defiers are likely to be small. The bias and difficulty that they create for the 
estimate of the causal effect and its interpretation are therefore also likely to be relatively 
minor. 
5.1.4. A binary number of children 
We use IVs based on twin births because we are interested in the causal effect of the 
number of children in the family. The number of children is a discrete variable taking on 
positive integer values. However, this variable is reduced to a binary variable when we use 
IVs based on twin births. IVs based on (parity-specific) twin births are binary; either a family 
experienced a twin birth at the studied parity or not. When using binary twin birth IVs, the 
variation in the number of children is therefore also reduced to two different values; families 
that do not experience a (parity-specific) twin birth are assigned the average number of 
children in that group, and families that experience a (parity-specific) twin birth are assigned 
the (slightly higher) average of that group.17 Therefore, the only variation in the number of 
                                                 
17 Again, this is assuming that there are no other factors that we must include to adjust 
our first-stage regression. If we include other factors, then the predicted values for the 
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children that is used for the analyses is that families that experience a (parity-specific) twin 
birth, on average, have a larger number of children than families that, instead, have a single 
birth at the studied parity.  
The birth of twins instead of a single birth at the studied parity should be the only reason 
why families that have twins (at the studied parity) have a larger number of children than do 
other families. This proposal is what we assume in the exclusion restriction, that there 
should be no systematic differences between families that do and do not experience a 
(parity-specific) twin birth. If there were such systematic differences, then it would be 
relevant to include an indicator for these families in the analytical model.  
IVs based on (parity-specific) twin births are not valid if the twin birth has effects on 
families other than increasing the number of children for some families. The instrument is, 
for example, not valid if a twin birth as the second birth induces some families to have four 
children instead of the three children they originally intended. This situation could only 
occur if a twin birth as the second birth changed the preferences of the parents, the costs of 
fertility control, or the cost of rearing the children. Any of these factors would make families 
experiencing a twin birth systematically different from families not experiencing a twin birth 
as the second birth. Such systematic differences make IVs violate the exclusion restriction 
and would bias the estimated effect.  
Previous studies have discussed this type of violations of the exclusion restriction. 
Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010), for example, discuss how a parity-specific twin birth 
affects the number of children at the studied parity but with the important difference that it 
has an effect “only (or mostly) at the parity of occurrence” (p. 776, italics added). They 
proceed to discuss the reasons why (parity-specific) twin birth IVs are also associated with a 
larger number of children at higher parities (Angrist, Lacy and Schlosser (2010), p. 788fn15). 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin ((1980b), p. 234) also discuss how families that experience a twin 
birth are also affected in ways other than having an “extra” child being born at the studied 
parity (see also Angrist and Evans (1998), p. 473). These discussions are explanations of how 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of children are, as noted above, a linear combination of these factors plus the 
unique variation added by the instrument. This unique variation is still binary. 
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their IVs violate the exclusion restriction. Rosenzweig and Wolpin ((2000), p. 832) clarified 
that when we use twin birth IVs to study effects on women, it is “necessary to assume that 
… having twins has no effect on the costs of children for identification to be achieved”. 
This assumption is also necessary when using twin birth IVs to study how children are 
affected by their number of siblings (Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)).  
If twin birth IVs are valid, then they should therefore make the treatment—the number 
of children—a binary variable in the empirical model. We therefore have a situation with a 
binary instrument and a binary treatment. Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) explained how 
we can use the potential outcomes framework to analyze such situations through the four 
types created by combining the binary instrument and treatment. I discuss twin birth IVs 
further below, assuming that both the instrument and the treatment are binary. A potential 
objection to this assumption is that the treatment of interest—the number of children—is 
not actually a binary variable. The implication could be that twin birth IVs should be 
discussed using the non-binary version of the LATE, the “average causal response” (Angrist 
and Imbens (1995)). However, doing so would only lead us back to the fact that the 
treatment in the twin birth IV case is binary.  
A parity-specific twin birth should be the only thing that creates systematic differences in 
the number of children between parents who do and do not experience it. All variation in 
the number of children should therefore be at the studied parity. If, for example, we use a 
twin as the second birth as the IV, then the only variation in the number of children related 
to the (valid) IV should be that some families that wanted two children had three because of 
the twin birth. Angrist and Imbens (1995) show that a two-stage least squares method 
“identifies a weighted average of per-unit treatment effects along the length of a causal 
response function” (p. 431). Because all exogenous variation is at the studied parity, the 
causal response function is reduced to a binary indicator. Regardless of whether the 
treatment is binary or not, the LATE “is the average causal effect of treatment for those 
whose treatment status is affected by the instrument” (Angrist and Imbens (1995), p. 434). 
In the twin IV case, these are the parents who, for example, wanted two children but had 
three because of the twin birth. These are the only people whose treatment status, i.e., 
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number of children, is affected by the instrument, i.e., the parity-specific twin birth. The 
treatment when using twin birth IVs is therefore essentially binary.  
5.2. The definition of the treatment for twin birth IVs 
The estimation of any causal effect is carried out by both conceptually defining it and 
empirically estimating it (Holland (1986), Heckman (2005), Imbens and Rubin (2015)). 
Conceptual definitions without any empirical estimation quickly turn into speculation about 
hypotheticals. However, an empirical estimation without a well-defined counterfactual 
situation for which the causal effect is estimated also risks becoming less than productive. 
The definition of the causal effect is conceptual but still has important implications for the 
empirical estimation of the effect. It defines the specific treatment of which we estimate the 
effect, and therefore, it also has consequences for how to think about the assumptions 
underlying the empirical estimation.  
The conceptual model underlying the use of IVs based on twin births, including the 
treatment, has been insufficiently discussed in the previous literature.18 To borrow the 
harshly formulated judgment of James Heckman, the twin IV literature is an example of 
when analysts have wanted “something for nothing: a definition of causality without a 
clearly articulated model of the phenomenon being described” (Heckman (2005), p. 2). The 
estimated causal effect has not been carefully defined with regard to the treatment or the 
model determining the treatment, which has prevented critical discussions of the implicit 
assumptions made when using twin births as IVs (compare Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), 
pp. 828–829).19 
                                                 
18 The aim has always been to estimate the causal effect of exogenous variation in the 
number of children on the outcome (e.g., Bronars and Grogger (1994), p. 1142, Angrist and 
Evans (1998), p. 474, Jacobsen, Pearce III, and Rosenbloom (1999), p. 457, and Black, 
Devereux and Salvanes (2005), p. 670).  
19 “[T]he absence of models in the natural natural experiment literature [such as that 
using twin births as IVs] does not mean that there are no important and implausible 
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The ambiguity in the previous literature on the definition of the treatment can be 
exemplified using Angrist and Evans (1998). In the introduction, they state that “both 
twinning and the sex-mix instrument identify the impact of moving from the second to the 
third child” (Angrist and Evans (1998), p. 452). They then explain that “when [the 
instrument] ݖ௜ is an indicator of multiple births at the second pregnancy, Twins-2, the IV 
estimates reflect the effect of children on labor supply for those who have had more 
children than they otherwise would have because of twinning” (Angrist and Evans (1998), p. 
458). These statements correspond to treatments with subtle but important differences that 
have been overlooked in the literature. The first—and original—interpretation of the 
treatment is that twin births lead to an exogenous increase in the number of children in some 
families. In the words of Rosenzweig and Wolpin ((1980), p. 232, italics added): 
“To the extent that multiple births from one pregnancy are unanticipated and children 
cannot readily be bought or sold, some households with twins will have experienced 
an exogenous increase in [the number of children] N above the level [of the desired 
number of children] N* which would otherwise have been achieved”. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin did not use any explicit potential outcomes framework when 
they wrote about twin birth IVs. However, from what they write, it is still clear that they 
interpret the birth of an “unwanted” child as the treatment (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1980a), p. 338, (1980b), pp. 232–233).20 An “unwanted” child is not the same as any other 
child, but such a situation still basically amounts to being an exogenous increase in the 
number of children. 
The other interpretation of the treatment mentioned in Angrist and Evans ((1998, p. 452) 
is having “another” child, for example, a third child if we use a twin birth as second birth as 
                                                                                                                                                 
assumptions being implicitly used by the authors in interpreting the estimates they have 
obtained” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000), p. 829). 
20 In practice—because of data limitations—Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b) use the 
share of twins among all births as the instrument. I do not understand the conceptual 
treatment or its causal effect in this specification, and it is not discussed in their paper.  
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the IV. This interpretation is different from having one more child at any parity but should 
be a generalizable effect at the studied parity.  
The last alternative interpretation—as argued by, for example, Angrist and Pischke (2008) 
and Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010)—is that the treatment is the “extra” child born at 
the studied parity in all families experiencing a twin birth at that parity. Angrist, Lavy, and 
Schlosser (2010) have one of the best discussions on the effect estimated by twin birth IVs 
in the literature. Nonetheless, the closest they come to an explicit definition of the treatment 
is the statement that the “treatment is defined as a dummy for having another child” 
(Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010), p. 788).21 Below, I discuss the additional claims they 
make about the estimated effect that means that the treatment they have in mind is the 
“extra” child born at the studied parity in all families experiencing a twin birth at that parity. 
This treatment is quite specific, and the causal effect of it is unlikely to be applicable to the 
number of children in general. 
5.2.1. The development of the definition of the treatment in previous research 
The early studies after Rosenzweig and Wolpin’s 1980 papers all studied the effects of the 
number of children on women using the twin as first birth instrument (Bronars and Grogger 
                                                 
21 There is some ambiguity in what Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) think about the 
definition of the treatment. Even if they define the treatment as being “a dummy for having 
another child” (p. 788), they also discuss how “the subpopulation of compliers consists of 
individuals who switch from having fewer than j to at least j children because of the 
instrument” (p. 787). The clause “because of the instrument” acknowledges that some 
families would have had another child even without the twin birth. This acknowledgment is 
also reflected in their discussion of their first-stage coefficients, where they explain why 
these are lower than the coefficients estimated by Angrist and Evans (1998): “Multiple births 
result in a smaller increase in family size when families would have been large even in the 
absence of a multiple birth” (Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010), p. 785). Bringing the 
desired number of children into the definition moves the interpretation in the direction of 
“unwanted” children. 
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1994; Angrist and Evans 1998; Jacobsen, Pearce III and Rosenbloom 1999). When studying 
the effect on mothers, it makes some sense to study the effect of a temporary increase, the 
“timing failure” of a twin birth (e.g., Bronars and Grogger (1994), p. 1142, Angrist and 
Evans (1998), p. 452, Jacobsen, Pearce III and Rosenbloom (1999), p. 457). All these studies 
acknowledge that the twin as first birth instrument mainly affects the timing of the births 
rather than the final achieved family size. That the early “follower” studies all studied 
mothers using the twin as first birth instrument can be part of the explanation for the shift 
in the interpretation from an “unwanted” birth to “another” or an “extra” child being born. 
The literature using twin births as IVs to investigate the effect on children took off after a 
number of publications in 2005 (Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2005) [later published in 
2010], Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), see also Cáceres-Delpiano (2006)). In many 
cases, the interpretation of the treatment then returned to being an “unwanted” birth. The 
discussion in, for example, Black, Devereux and Salvanes ((2005), (2010)) indicates that they 
consider the “unwanted” children to be the treatment. They also mention how Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin's (1980b) model assumes that “parents have an optimal number of children” 
and that the “birth of twins can vary the actual family size from the desired size” (Black, 
Devereux and Salvanes (2005), p. 681; see also, e.g., Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2010), p. 
37, Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012), p. 754). Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) also 
investigate the effect on children while nonetheless arguing that the “extra” child born is the 
treatment. Even if the treatment and causal effect are undefined in most cases, there are 
therefore three different interpretations in the literature. I argue that neither of these 
interpretations leads to valid estimates of any causal effect. To explain why, I discuss the 
conceptual definition of the estimated effects and each of the assumptions necessary for 
estimating them.  
5.2.2. A unit-level definition of the causal effect  
In the potential outcomes framework, the causal effect is conceptually defined for a single 
unit of observation. As noted above, the causal effect is the difference in outcome between a 
situation in which the unit was treated and a situation in which the unit was not treated. At 
least one of these situation is in practice a hypothetical potential outcome. However, even if 
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we do not observe all outcomes for all families, we can think about their substantive 
meaning, which will depend on what we define as the treatment. I examine the three 
definitions discussed above, the birth of an “unwanted” child, the birth of “another” (e.g., 
third) child, and the birth of an “extra” child at the studied parity because of a twin birth. I 
assume, for the moment, that there are no other variables that we must include to adjust our 
estimates.  
The instrument, ܼ௜ , will be equal to one if the family experienced a (parity-specific) twin 
birth and zero otherwise. The value for the treatment, ௜ܹ , will depend on the value of the 
instrument, i.e., ௜ܹሺܼ௜ሻ, and how the unit reacts to being assigned to the treatment. The 
LATE is estimated for people whose treatment is affected by the instrument. The others are 
ignored based on assumptions. The causal effect is therefore defined by comparing units 
that are both indicated by the instrument and treated with units that are neither indicated 
nor treated. The corresponding unit-level definition of the causal effect is as follows:  
ߚ௜ ൌ ௜ܻ௢௕௦/௠௜௦ሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1ሻ െ ௜ܻ௠௜௦/௢௕௦ሺܼ௜ ൌ 0, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 0ሻ (6) 
If we define the birth of an “unwanted” child as the treatment, then the two situations 
correspond to:  
 The family experienced a twin birth at the studied parity and had an 
“unwanted” child. 
 The family did not experience a twin birth at the studied parity and did not 
have an “unwanted” child.  
By comparing these two situations, we estimate the effect of the birth of an unintended 
birth, i.e., an “unwanted” child. This effect is not the same as the effect of an increase in the 
number of children, but it could still be interesting to estimate.  
If we define having “another” child as the treatment, then the two situations correspond 
to: 
 The family experienced a twin birth at the studied parity and had “another”, 
e.g., third, child.  
 The family did not experience a twin birth at the studied parity and did not 
have “another” child, e.g., only had two children.  
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By comparing these two situations, we estimate the effect of voluntarily or involuntarily 
having “another” child.  
If, finally, we define the “extra” child born at the studied parity because of a twin birth at 
that parity as the treatment, then the two situations correspond to: 
 The family experienced a twin birth at the studied parity and therefore had an 
“extra” child being born at that parity. 
 The family did not experience a twin birth at the studies parity and therefore 
did not have an “extra” child born at that parity.  
By comparing these two situations, we consequently estimate the causal effect of 
experiencing a twin birth at the studied parity. This effect is not generalizable as an effect of 
the number of children in the family.  
To move from this unit-specific definition to the population, we must ensure that the 
units we compare across are truly comparable. The framework presented by Angrist, 
Imbens, and Rubin (1996) provides tools to aid us in this evaluation. The framework 
presents the four types that arise from the (binary) assignment to treatment and the (binary) 
receipt of the assigned treatments. In the twin birth IV case, the implication is that families 
either experience a parity-specific twin birth or not, the assignment to treatment and have an 
“unwanted”/“another”/“extra” child or not, the receipt of treatment. The four types are 
called compliers, always-takers, never-takers, and defiers. Their combinations of assignment 
and reception of treatment can be nicely summarized in a table (Table 3). 
TABLE 3. THE FOUR TYPES AS DEFINED BY THE ASSIGNMENT TO AND RECEIPT OF 
TREATMENT 
  Not assigned to treatment 
  Not treated Treated 
Assigned to treatment 
Not treated Never-takers Defiers 
Treated Compliers Always-takers 
 
 
Families that behave as we expect are compliers. They have an “unwanted”/“another”/ 
“extra” child if they experience a (parity-specific) twin birth and do not have any 
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“unwanted”/“another”/“extra” child if they do not experience a (parity-specific) twin birth. 
The compliers are the group for which the treatment is affected by the assignment to 
treatment, i.e., they comply with their assigned treatment.  
The other types do not comply with their assigned treatment in different ways. The 
defiers do the opposite of what was expected. They choose the treatment if they are not 
assigned to it and choose not to receive treatment if they are assigned to it. As noted above, 
it is likely that there are small groups of defiers in the twin birth IV case. I nonetheless 
accept the monotonicity assumption that there are none and ignore them in the following.  
 
The always-takers and never-takers are partially defined based on how they would have 
behaved had their assignment been different. Always-takers are treated regardless of whether 
they were assigned to treatment or not. The always-takers who are assigned to treatment are 
different from compliers because they would have received the treatment even if they had 
not been assigned to it. Never-takers are the opposite. They are not treated regardless of 
whether they were assigned to treatment or not. The never-takers who are not assigned to 
treatment are different from compliers because they would not have received treatment even 
if they had been assigned to it.  
Most often, therefore, we cannot observe which type a unit is because we can observe 
the same combination of assignment and treatment for two different types. If a unit is 
assigned to treatment and is treated, then it can, for example, be either a complier or an 
always-taker. A family that does not experience a (parity-specific) twin birth and that does 
not have an “unwanted”/“another”/“extra” child born is either a family of either compliers 
or never-takers. In practice, we are left with another, simpler cross-table but with two types 
in each cell (Table 4). 
The LATE is estimated by comparing the (conditional) expected values of the number of 
children and the outcome studied across the two columns of Table 4, that is, across the two 
levels of the instrument. We can estimate the causal effect of the treatment from the levels 
of the instrument because there are observations that comply with their assignment, namely, 
the compliers. For this group, the instrument determines the treatment, and therefore, they 
appear on different rows, treated and not treated.  
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TABLE 4. THE FOUR GROUPS WITHIN THE POPULATION WITH DIFFERENT ASSIGNED 
TREATMENTS AND DIFFERENT RECEPTIONS OF THEIR ASSIGNED TREATMENTS 
  Twin birth at the studied parity? 
  No Yes 
Treated? 
No Compliers and Never-takers 
(Defiers and) 
Never-takers 
Yes (Defiers and) Always-takers 
Compliers and 
Always-takers 
 
 
In addition to the compliers, there are also always-takers and never-takers in both 
columns. They are ignored in this method. Morgan and Winship ((2015), p. 308fn26) 
provide a nice summary of the assumption allowing us to ignore them: 
“In a sense, the outcomes of always takers and never takers represent a type of 
background noise that is ignored by the IV estimator. More precisely, always takers 
and never takers have a distribution of outcomes, but the distribution of these 
outcomes is balanced across the values of the instrument”. 
The observed differences across the columns will correspond to the differences between 
compliers provided that there are no systematic differences between the always-takers and 
never-takers who did and did not experience a (parity-specific) twin birth. This aspect is part 
of the exclusion restriction, which requires that there be (after variable adjustment) no 
systematic differences between the units indicated by the IV or not. The only acceptable 
systematic difference is that some of the families that experienced a (parity-specific) twin 
birth had an exogenous increase in their number of children, which, in turn, might have had 
consequences for the outcome studied. The exclusion restriction must hold for the IV to be 
valid. Naturally, this method will produce an estimate even if the assumption does not hold, 
but it will be biased. 
The types thus provide us with implications and comparisons that can be used to test the 
assumptions underlying the IV estimation. The definitions and formal statements of these 
assumptions are not always intuitive or helpful for thinking about whether the assumptions 
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are met, for example, when using twin birth IVs. The definitions of the assumptions that are 
based on the types are, at least to me, easier to comprehend and evaluate conceptually or 
empirically. To proceed with these evaluations, we must again discuss the definition of the 
treatment. 
5.2.3. The perfect compliance interpretation, an “extra” child 
Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser ((2010), e.g., pp. 776, 788) argue that IVs based on twin births 
are a special case among IVs because all families that experience a twin birth comply with 
their treatment, i.e., there is perfect compliance. This argument is also developed in the 
handbook by Angrist and Pischke ((2008), pp. 160–161) and has been adopted by some 
other researchers (e.g., Cáceres-Delpiano (2012a), p. 156, (2012b), p. 8, Cáceres-Delpiano 
and Simonsen (2012), p. 754, Baranowska-Rataj, de Luna and Ivarsson (2016), p. 1267, and 
Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak (2016), p. 350).22  
As noted above, it is somewhat unclear what Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) define 
the treatment to be. However, the statement about perfect compliance makes it clear. There 
will be perfect compliance in the twin birth IV case only if the treatment is defined as the 
“extra” child being born at the studied parity because of the twin birth.  
If we use the “extra” child being born at the studied parity because of the twin birth as 
the treatment, then there can be no never-takers. All families that experience a twin birth 
have the “extra” child. No family that does not experience a twin birth at the studied parity 
will have the “extra” child born because of a twin birth at that parity.23 Therefore, we can 
also exclude the always-takers. We are left with only compliers, i.e., perfect compliance 
                                                 
22 Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) also discussed compliance with the twin birth IV and, in 
contrast, found that “[t]he fact that the compliance rates are high is encouraging” (p. 134, 
italics added).  
23 It is indeed only through a twin birth at the studied parity that a family can have an 
“extra” child being born at the studied parity because of a twin birth. 
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(Table 5).24 This interpretation is attractive because it means that the estimated LATE is also 
the effect on the non-treated: “[s]pecifically, the subpopulation of compliers affected by the 
twins2 [twin as second birth] instrument is the entire population with two children” (Angrist, 
Lavy and Schlosser (2010), p. 788). This attractive feature comes at the cost of us estimating 
a quite specific causal effect that is nonetheless not very generalizable. 
TABLE 5. THE FOUR POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT AND RECEIPT OF 
TREATMENT OF THE “EXTRA” CHILD BORN AT THE STUDIED PARITY BECAUSE OF 
THE TWIN BIRTH 
  Twin birth at the studied parity? 
  No Yes 
“Extra” child born 
at the studied parity 
because of the twin birth? 
No Compliers  ——— 
Yes ——— Compliers  
 
5.2.4. The having “another” child interpretation 
To have perfect compliance, the treatment cannot be defined as having “another” child, for 
example, a third child if we use a twin as second birth instrument. If we interpret the 
treatment as “another” child, then there will again be no never-takers, but there will be 
always-takers (Table 6). In the (parity-specific) twin birth IV case, the overwhelming 
majority are not assigned to treatment, that is, do not experience a parity-specific twin birth. 
Nonetheless, there are many families that have, for example, a third child without having a 
twin as the second birth, that is, without being assigned to and complying with the 
treatment. Families that have “another” child without being assigned to have one through a 
twin birth are therefore not compliant with their assignment and are always-takers. In 
                                                 
24 With this interpretation, the first-stage coefficient should therefore always be equal to 
one.  
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addition, because there are always-takers, compliance is not perfect. Instead, we have a 
situation with one-sided noncompliance (Imbens and Rubin (2015), chap. 23). With this 
definition of the treatment, the first-stage coefficient is the share of families that are 
compliers, as indicated by the instrument. This share will correspond to the share of families 
that have a third child because of experiencing a twin birth.  
TABLE 6. THE FOUR POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT AND RECEIPT OF THE 
TREATMENT OF HAVING “ANOTHER” CHILD  
  Twin birth at the studied parity? 
  No Yes 
“Another” child? 
No Compliers  ——— 
Yes  Always-takers 
Compliers and 
Always-takers 
 
5.2.5. The “unwanted” children interpretation 
The interpretation of the treatment that comes closest to an exogenous increase in the 
number of children is the interpretation of the birth of an “unwanted” child as the 
treatment. One way to think about this interpretation is to think of all twin births as an 
attempt to assign an exogenous increase in the number of children (by one child) to a set of 
randomly chosen families. However, the reception of the treatment will vary, as some 
families foil the mad, scientific dream by having always wanted to have (at least) one more 
child. For such families, the assignment will only lead to them having the children they want 
unexpectedly fast.  
If we interpret the treatment as being an “unwanted” child born in some families, then as 
a result, there are both always-takers and never-takers in the population (Table 7). The 
estimated LATE will therefore be no more generalizable than usual, and it will be the effect 
for the subpopulation that has its treatment status changed by its assignment to the 
treatment—in other words, the compliers.  
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The compliers and never-takers (Table 7, Cell A) consist of families that did not 
experience a twin birth at the studied parity and that also do not have an “unwanted” child. 
Some of these families will proceed to have more children after the studied parity, and some 
of these births will be twins. By definition, we know that they always intended to have as 
many children as they end up with.  
TABLE 7. THE FOUR POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT AND RECEIPT OF THE 
TREATMENT OF AN “UNWANTED” CHILD 
  Twin birth at the studied parity? 
  No Yes 
Having an 
“unwanted” child? 
No 
Cell A 
Compliers and 
Never-takers 
Cell B 
 
Never-takers 
Yes 
Cell C 
 
Always-takers 
Cell D 
Compliers and 
Always-takers 
 
 
The group in Cell B of Table 7—never-takers—consists of families that experienced a 
twin birth at the studied parity but that still do not have an “unwanted” child. Again, some 
of these families will proceed to have more children after the studied parity, and some of 
these births will be twins. Again, by definition, we know that for the families in this group, 
they always intended to have as many children as they end up with.  
The group in Cell C of Table 7—always-takers—consists of families that did not 
experience a twin birth at the studied parity but that still have an “unwanted” child. Who we 
think belongs in this groups depends on whether we allow for the possibility of unintended 
pregnancies or not, that is, whether if a singleton birth can lead to an “unwanted” child or 
not. 
Allowing for unintended pregnancies is more realistic, given the empirical evidence 
(Singh, Sedge, and Hussain (2010), Alkema et al. (2013), Bachrach and Morgan (2013)). 
However, the exclusion restriction then requires us to assume that there are no systematic 
differences between families that have an “unwanted” child as a result of singleton and twin 
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births, which is not very realistic. It is plausible that “unwanted” singleton births are, on 
average, more common among parents with unobserved characteristics associated with 
worse outcomes for the children. If this plausibility is the case, then the effect that we 
estimate using the twin birth IVs will be positively biased (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 
(1996), p. 451).  
 
If we assume that there are no unintended pregnancies, then it is only twin births that can 
lead to “unwanted” children. The only group that can be always-takers in Cell C of Table 7 
consists of parents who wanted at least one more child after the studied parity and who 
experienced a twin birth at one of these subsequent births. This subsequent twin birth leads 
to the birth of an “unwanted” child. 
The groups in Cell D of Table 7—compliers and always-takers—consist of families that 
experienced a twin birth at the studied parity and that have an “unwanted” child. If we do 
not allow for any unintended pregnancies, all “unwanted” children are born from twin 
births. The “unwanted” child for the families in Cell D can therefore only be the result of 
the twin birth at the studied parity or a subsequent twin birth. Not allowing for unintended 
pregnancies also means that all parents will stop having children when they reach or surpass 
their desired number. This assumption thus implies that parents who experienced a twin 
birth at the studied parity and who have an “unwanted” child wanted only ܰ∗ children but 
had ܰ∗ ൅ 1 because of the twin birth. This group consists of compliers that had their 
treatment status, here, their number of children, changed by the assignment to the 
treatment, here, the twin birth. These families are the families for which we estimate the 
LATE when using twin births as IVs for the number of children. 
5.3. The random assignment of twin births 
For twin birth IVs to work, there cannot be anything that creates systematic differences in 
the outcome between families that do and do not experience a (parity-specific) twin birth 
except the effect on the number of children from the twin birth. To that end, we rely on the 
randomness of twin births. Provided that twin births are indeed random events, there 
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should be no systematic differences between families at a specific parity that do and do not 
experience a twin birth (on average and in large samples).  
In the literature applying this method, it has been known for a long period of time that 
twin births are not completely random events (e.g., Angrist and Evans (1998), p. 469). To 
date, however, it has been viewed as relatively unproblematic to assume that they are 
random enough to be ignorable or “as good as randomly assigned” (Angrist and Pischke 
(2008),  
p. 160). However, recently, there have been some studies challenging this assumption by 
showing that even weak systematic influences on the likelihood of a twin birth have 
substantively important consequences for the results (Bhalotra and Clarke (2016), 
Braakmann and Wildman (2016), Farbmacher, Guber, and Vikström (2018)). While I think 
that these challenges are extremely important to consider for the literature applying this 
method, I ignore this problem in this paper and assume that twin births occur at random. 
The issues that I raise in this paper are, therefore, problems beyond what is being argued in 
these other challenges to the validity of IVs based on twin births. 
Twin births are not automatically unrelated to all relevant characteristics of the parents 
merely because they occur at random. Each birth is a possibility of a twin birth. There is 
therefore a positive association between the chance of experiencing a twin birth and the 
desired number of children. Such associations pose serious challenges to our analyses 
because the desired number of children, in turn, is associated with, for example, the parents’ 
preferences for child “quality”. Provided that we cannot adjust for these preferences, the 
fact that the IV is associated with the desired number of children is a serious problem.  
Table 8 presents how different specifications of the twin birth IV are associated with the 
families’ desired and realized number of children and the number of births. I have chosen to 
illustrate the problematic associations using the desired number of children because it is 
more easily comprehensible than an invented proxy for the parents’ preferences. The 
correlations were calculated based on the simulated population presented above. 
Observably, the non-parity-specific IVs—a twin birth as the last birth, the share of twin 
births, and any twin birth—are all associated with the desired number of children. The 
associations are not strong, as measured by Pearson’s correlation coefficient, but the 
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presence of these associations will nonetheless affect our results. Reassuringly, we observe 
that the parity-specific IVs—a twin birth as the first birth and a twin birth as the second 
birth—are not associated with the desired number of children. This observation comes at 
the cost of them being worse predictors of the realized number of children. However, as 
IVs, they are clearly superior because they are not by definition associated with one of the 
confounding factors in our analyses, the desired number of children.  
 
All twin birth IVs are negatively associated with the number of births, which is natural 
because a twin birth consists of two births at once. This association is not automatically a 
problem, but it could be if we have reason to believe that the effect of the number of 
siblings varies between parities, as recently argued in a couple of papers discussing twin birth 
IVs (Mogstad and Wiswall (2016), Guo, Yi, and Zhang (2017)). 
If twin births occur at random, then there should be no association between the type and 
the chance of experiencing a twin birth (Morgan and Winship (2015), pp. 311–312). The 
implication is that the probability of being a complier, never-taker, or always-taker should be 
the same regardless of whether a unit is indicated by the instrument or not. Henderson et al. 
((2008), p. 171) call this phenomenon an “unconfounded type”. 
This is clearly not the case with twin birth IVs (Tables 9 and 10). The probabilities of the 
types vary between different specifications of the treatment and between populations. In 
some instances, the probabilities are almost balanced in the populations based on Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) and Åslund and Grönqvist (2010). However, even in these 
cases, it is clear that twin births are not random when conditioning on the type.  
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TABLE 8. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWIN BIRTH INSTRUMENT AND FAMILIES’ DESIRED 
AND REALIZED NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND THE NUMBER OF BIRTHS 
 Desired Realized Births 
Panel A. Distribution based on:  
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 
Twin as first birth +0.000 +0.008 –0.096 
Twin as second birth +0.000 +0.042 –0.067 
Twin as last birth +0.022 +0.074 –0.048 
Share twin births +0.031 +0.068 –0.074 
Any twin birth +0.093 +0.125 –0.014 
Panel B. Distribution based on:  
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 
Twin as first birth +0.000 +0.002 –0.106 
Twin as second birth +0.000 +0.045 –0.065 
Twin as last birth +0.015 +0.069 –0.062 
Share twin births +0.025 +0.061 –0.090 
Any twin birth +0.089 +0.121 –0.027 
Panel C. Distribution based on:  
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 
Twin as first birth +0.000 –0.006 –0.055 
Twin as second birth +0.000 +0.001 –0.049 
Twin as last birth +0.007 +0.028 –0.032 
Share twin births +0.019 +0.024 –0.063 
Any twin birth +0.139 +0.142 +0.048 
Panel D. Distribution based on:  
Roberts and Warren (2017) 
Twin as first birth +0.000 +0.001 –0.060 
Twin as second birth +0.000 +0.012 –0.051 
Twin as last birth +0.018 +0.047 –0.026 
Share twin births +0.029 +0.046 –0.047 
Any twin birth +0.133 +0.143 +0.048 
Note: The 230 (all but twin birth as the second birth) or 141 (twin birth as the second birth) observations were 
weighted by the probabilities of each outcome and the number of children desired. Each panel presents figures 
in which the distribution of the desired number of children is based on the study in the heading of the panel. 
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TABLE 9. THE PROBABILITY OF BELONGING TO A TYPE, TWIN AS SECOND BIRTH INSTRUMENT WITH AN “UNWANTED” CHILD AS 
THE TREATMENT 
 The probability of belonging to a type within levels of the instrument 
 Indicated by instrument Not indicated by instrument 
 Compliers Never-takers Always-takers Compliers Never-takers Always-takers 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 0.11 0.11 0.77 0.34 0.34 0.32 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 0.11 0.10 0.79 0.34 0.34 0.32 
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 0.10 0.43 0.46 0.34 0.33 0.33 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 0.13 0.25 0.61 0.34 0.33 0.33 
 
TABLE 10. THE PROBABILITY OF BELONGING TO A TYPE, TWIN AS SECOND BIRTH INSTRUMENT WITH “ANOTHER” CHILD, HERE, A 
THIRD CHILD, AS THE TREATMENT 
 The probability of belonging to a type within levels of the instrument 
 Indicated by instrument Not indicated by instrument 
 Compliers Noncompliers Compliers Noncompliers 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.50 
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 0.81 0.19 0.48 0.52 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 0.66 0.34 0.49 0.51 
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5.4. Twin births should affect the outcome only by affecting the number of children 
Random assignment to treatment is not enough to have an instrument that satisfies the 
necessary assumptions. To be able to estimate a LATE, we need both the random 
assignment and the exclusion restriction (e.g., Imbens and Angrist (1994), p. 468, Angrist 
and Pischke (2008), p. 153). The exclusion restriction requires that assignment to treatment 
not be associated with the outcome beyond changing the treatment received. The 
implication is that the potential outcomes among the units that have received the treatment 
should be balanced across those that were assigned to treatment and those that were not 
assigned to treatment (Equations 7 and 8). We need this implication to be true to be able to 
ignore the always-takers and never-takers.  
Always-takers:  
௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 0, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1ሻ  (7) 
Never-takers: 
௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 0, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 0ሻ (8) 
The exclusion restriction can also be expressed as a stochastic restriction so that the 
distribution of potential outcomes is balanced between the two groups within each type. 
Below, I present the averages of the desired and realized number of children by type and 
value of the instrument based on my simulated population, as presented above. Again, the 
definition of the types depends on the definition of the treatment. I present the results for 
the definition of the treatment as “another”, e.g., a third, child and as an “unwanted” child.  
First, we analyze the exclusion restriction for when we use a twin as second birth 
instrument and define the treatment as having a third child. Observably, among the 
compliers, the families that are not indicated by the instrument both desired and have 
exactly two children in all four populations. The reason for this result is that the only way a 
family that can be a complier when it did not have a twin birth as the second birth is to 
desire and have exactly two children. Then, such families are not assigned to treatment, i.e., 
no twin birth, and are not treated, i.e., do not have a third child. The families that are 
indicated by the instrument have a larger realized number of children than the families that 
are not indicated. This difference in the realized number of children is therefore in the 
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direction that we want it to be. Disconcertingly, however, the differences are too large, with 
all being larger than one. The explanation for this result is that there are also substantive 
differences in the desired number of children. These differences constitute a clear indication 
of a violation of the exclusion restriction.  
The pattern is the opposite among the always-takers. Among them, families that do not 
have a twin birth as the second birth both have and desire a larger number of children than 
do families that have twins. The size of the differences varies between the populations but is 
always substantial. Again, these differences indicate clear violations of the exclusion 
restriction.  
From the first-stage coefficients in Table 2, families that experienced a twin birth, and 
that are therefore indicated by the instrument, have, on average, a larger number of children. 
This difference is a weighted average of the positive and negative differences for the 
compliers and always-takers, respectively. 
TABLE 11. THE AVERAGE DESIRED AND REALIZED NUMBER OF CHILDREN AMONG 
COMPLIERS AND ALWAYS-TAKERS FOR A TWIN AS SECOND BIRTH INSTRUMENT 
WITH HAVING A THIRD CHILD AS THE TREATMENT 
Compliers 
The average desired 
number of children 
The average realized 
number of children 
 Indicated by instrument?  
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Overall Yes No Overall Yes No 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 2.03 2.77 2.00 2.04 3.27 2.00 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 2.02 2.74 2.00 2.04 3.26 2.00 
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 2.23 4.61 2.00 2.25 4.80 2.00 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 2.08 3.60 2.00 2.10 3.94 2.00 
Noncompliers / Always-takers 
The average desired 
number of children 
The average realized 
number of children 
 Indicated by instrument?  
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Overall Yes No Overall Yes No 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 3.50 2.77 3.53 3.76 3.27 3.77 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 3.49 2.74 3.52 3.73 3.26 3.75 
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 5.17 4.61 5.18 5.39 4.80 5.41 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 4.37 3.60 4.39 4.63 3.94 4.65 
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The pattern of results is very similar if we instead define the treatment as having an 
“unwanted” child (still using a twin as second birth instrument as our instrument). In this 
case, in addition to compliers, we have both always-takers and never-takers. The families 
indicated by the instrument have a larger number of children among the compliers and 
never-takers but not among the always-takers. More disturbingly, for all types we observe 
clear differences in the desired number of children among the families indicated by the 
instrument and not (Table 12). Again, these differences indicate clear violations of the 
exclusion restriction.25 
TABLE 12. THE AVERAGE DESIRED AND REALIZED NUMBER OF CHILDREN AMONG 
COMPLIERS AND ALWAYS-TAKERS FOR A TWIN AS SECOND BIRTH INSTRUMENT 
WITH HAVING AN “UNWANTED” CHILD AS THE TREATMENT 
The average desired  
number of children 
Compliers Never-takers Always-takers 
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 2.02 2.60 3.52 2.60 2.02 3.97 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 2.01 2.59 3.51 2.59 2.01 3.96 
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 2.22 4.73 5.18 4.73 2.22 4.09 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 2.07 3.51 4.38 3.51 2.07 4.03 
The average realized  
number of children 
Compliers Never-takers Always-takers 
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Indicated by 
instrument? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) 3.02 2.60 3.52 2.60 3.02 4.97 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) 3.01 2.59 3.51 2.59 3.01 4.96 
Stradford, van Poppel and Lumey (2017) 3.22 4.73 5.18 4.73 3.22 5.09 
Roberts and Warren (2017) 3.07 3.51 4.38 3.51 3.07 5.03 
 
 
  
                                                 
25 Because the twin birth IVs violate the exclusion restriction and, as we will observe, 
the SUTVA, “reduced form” estimates of the causal effect of a twin birth on the outcome 
(as in, for example, Baranowska-Rataj, Barclay and Kolk (2017)) will not produce valid 
results either.  
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The definition of the estimated effect for a population (following the notation of 
Imbens and Rubin (2015), p. 525) is as follows: (9) 
ߚመ ൌ ߨ௖௢ ∙ 1௖ܰ௢ ෍ ൫ ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1ሻ െ ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 0, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 0ሻ൯௜:ீ೔ୀ௖௢
൅ 
ߨ௡௖ ∙ 1௡ܰ௖ ෍ ൫ ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1ሻ െ ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 0, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 1ሻ൯௜:ீ೔ୀ௡௖
 
Our estimate of the effect of interest, ߚመ , is a weighted sum of the average difference 
between the compliers that are indicated by the instrument and not and the average 
difference between the noncompliers—always-takers—that are indicated by the instrument 
and not. The weights are defined by the shares of compliers, ߨ௖௢, and noncompliers, ߨ௡௖, 
in the population. If the exclusion restriction holds, then we can assume that there are no 
differences between noncompliers that are or are not indicated by the instrument. This part 
of Equation 8 can therefore be ignored. However, if the exclusion restriction does not 
hold, then we can no longer estimate the LATE.  
If we define having “another”, i.e., a third child as the treatment, then the noncompliers 
that are not indicated by the instrument both desire and have a larger number of children. 
If there is a negative effect on child outcomes from either or both, then it will paradoxically 
lead to a positive bias in the estimated effect. The reason is that we estimate the effect that 
a twin birth has above and beyond the effect of a larger number of desired and realized 
children. If there is a positive effect of either or both the desired and realized number of 
children on child outcomes, then the bias will be negative. We can therefore know that the 
effect we estimate will be biased toward zero. If we instead define an “unwanted” child as 
the treatment, then we must expand the equation to include all four types (Imbens and 
Rubin (2015), p. 553). The idea is exactly the same, but predicting the direction of the bias 
becomes less straightforward because the patterns are opposite for always- and never-
takers.  
5.5. The stable unit treatment value assumptions (SUTVAs I and II) 
To estimate well-defined causal effects, we must rely on the SUTVAs (Imbens and Rubin 
(2015), pp. 9–12, see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), p. 446). The SUTVA 
includes two parts, SUTVAs I and II (Cox (1958), pp. 17–21, Rubin (1990), p. 475, 
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Heckman (2005), pp. 11–12, 35–36, 43, Small et al. (2017)). The first part requires that 
there should be no interference between the studied units; the treatment of one unit should 
therefore not affect another. This requirement is the part of the SUTVA that is most often 
acknowledged in the literature, when it is discussed at all (e.g., Morgan and Winship (2015), 
pp. 48–52).26 The second part of SUTVA requires that there be only one version of the 
treatment; there should be “No Hidden Variations of Treatments” (Imbens and Rubin 
(2015), p. 11).27 Rather, there can be different versions of the treatment, ܹ and ܹᇱ, 
provided that the potential outcomes are the same regardless of which version one 
receives, i.e., ௜ܻ൫ܼ௜, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ሻ൯ ൌ ௜ܻ൫ܼ௜, ௜ܹᇱሺܼ௜ሻ൯. 
If the effect of the treatment is not constant, then the estimated effect is “an artificial 
quantity” (Cox (1958), pp. 15–19). It does not necessarily correspond to the average 
treatment effect across the groups with the different treatment effects. Cox provides simple 
numerical examples illustrating that in the presence of varying treatment effects, the 
estimated average effect does not have to be in the range of the effects within subgroups of 
the population. An important reason why the effect of the treatment is not constant across 
units is when it depends on some (observable or unobservable) differences in the 
characteristics of the units (Cox (1958), p. 18). If we do not or cannot adjust our analyses 
                                                 
26 The SUTVA is not mentioned in any of the papers applying twin birth IVs, and it is 
never evaluated. Angrist and Evans (1998), Angrist, Lavy and Achlosser (2010), 
Baranowska-Rataj, de Luna and Ivarsson (2016), Baranowska-Rataj and Matysiak (2016), 
Braakmann and Wildman (2016), Silles (2016), and Brinch, Mogstad and Wiswall (2017) 
cite Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) for the definition of compliers and the LATE. 
Åslund and Grönqvist (2010) cite Angrist (2004), and Cáceres-Delpiano (2012b) and 
Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2012) cite Angrist and Pischke (2008) for the same 
purpose. None of the other papers listed in Table 1 cites Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 
(1996), which is the only text defining the LATE that explicitly mentions the SUTVA 
(before Imbens and Rubin 2015). 
27 Small et al. ((2017), p. 567) write about this issue such that there should be “no 
unrepresented versions of the IV”. This point leads to a very similar objection to twin birth 
IVs. The instrument—a parity-specific twin birth—will or will not lead to the birth of an 
unintended, i.e., “unwanted”, child.  
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for these differences in characteristics, then the estimated effect cannot tell us anything 
about the true effect.28   
This situation is what occurs in the twin birth IV case if we consider the extra child 
born at the studied parity because of a twin birth as the treatment. With this definition of 
the treatment, there are two versions of the treatment: one version if the twin birth leads to 
an unexpected and unintended, that is, exogenous, increase in the number of children and 
another if the twin birth leads to only an unexpectedly short birth interval of otherwise 
wanted children. The version of the treatment that the families receive depends on their 
desired number of children. We could accommodate for these versions of the treatment if 
we could observe and adjust for the presence of “unwanted” children, which corresponds 
to adding a variable to the definition of the potential outcomes (Rubin (1990), p. 475):  
௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1, ௜ܷ ൌ 0ሻ ് ௜ܻሺܼ௜ ൌ 1, ௜ܹሺܼ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1, ௜ܷ ൌ 1ሻ (10) 
The entire reason why we use twin birth IVs, as noted above, is that we think that there 
is a difference between having an intended and an unintended child. Therefore, we cannot 
expect these potential outcomes to be the same. This part of the SUTVA is therefore not 
satisfied. One way to fix this problem would be to instead interpret the “unwanted” child 
as the treatment. However, as we have observed, doing so does not work well either 
because the exclusion restriction is violated. 
6. Conclusions 
IVs based on twin births are both a well-known and widespread solution for finding 
exogenous variation in the number of children in families. They have been used in many 
studies, with at least 17 new studies having been published in 2016 and 2017 alone. A 
worrying trend is that there is also an increase in the number of published studies that 
apply invalid versions of the twin birth instrument, such as an indicator of any twin birth. 
There is a need for researchers applying this method or evaluating others’ applications of 
this method to raise the methodological standards. I think that one way of achieving these 
raised standards is to also interpret the methods that we use and the assumptions that we 
                                                 
28 Small et al. (2017) have recently proposed a new type of causal effect that relaxes both 
the monotonicity assumption and the “no hidden variations of treatments” part of the 
SUTVA. 
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make verbally to explain their empirical implications. I think that doing so will help us 
when we work to develop new methods to find exogenous variation in the number of 
children.  
Summarizing my findings, I think that the problems with twin birth IVs are serious 
enough that we should stop using this method. Useful interpretations of twin birth IVs 
lead to violations of the independence assumption, the exclusion restriction, and the 
SUTVA. Studies using twin births as IVs have estimated a casual rather than a causal effect 
of the number of children in the family.  
The biases of this method are likely to have contributed to the current state of 
knowledge on these important questions. Both the common inclusion of incomplete 
families and the violation of the exclusion restriction will work to bias the estimated effect 
toward zero. The biases are therefore likely to contribute to the common pattern of results 
of a negative association but no causal effect when using a twin birth IV. It is time to stop 
using these IVs and to return to these important questions using other methods. 
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i Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a) show that a twin birth as the first birth is a poor 
predictor of the number of children in complete families. In their words, “the occurrence 
of twins in the first birth represents mainly a timing failure” (p. 341). This aspect makes a 
twin birth as the first birth a weak instrument for the number of children. In incomplete 
families, it will capture a “timing” effect that will depend on the time since the birth. 
Oliveira (2016a) studies the effect of the number of children on families in China. She uses 
data from a survey with retrospective fertility histories, and therefore, the data include only 
complete families. Nonetheless, she finds a surprisingly large and significant difference in 
family size (c.+0.9) when comparing families that experienced a twin birth as the first birth 
to other families. One possible explanation for this large difference is the one-child policy. 
This policy was implemented after the first birth of most of the mothers in the sample, but 
it could still have reduced their propensity to proceed to have a third child. All other 
studies using twins as the first birth use data on incomplete families (Bronars and Grogger 
1994; Jacobsen, Pearce III and Rosenbloom 1999; Glick, Marani and Shan 2007; Oliveira 
2016b; Baranowska Rataj and Matysiak 2016; He and Zhu 2016; Arouri, Ben-Youssef and 
Nguyen Viet 2017). The timing effect will therefore contribute to artificially strengthening 
the twin as first birth instrument in these applications.  
 
ii See Angrist and Pischke ((2008), p. 132) on the results in Angrist and Evans (1998):  
“The twins instrument in Angrist and Evans (1998) is a dummy for a multiple second 
birth in a sample of mothers with at least two children. The twins first-stage is .625, 
... This means that 37.5 percent of the mothers with two or more children would 
have had a third birth anyway; a multiple third birth increases this proportion to 1”.  
See Angrist and Pischke ((2015), p. 128) on the results in Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser 
(2010):  
“A second twin birth, however, increases average family size by .32, that is, by about 
one-third of a child. Why do twin births increase family size by a Salomonic 
fractional child? Many Israeli parents would like three or four children; their family 
size is largely unaffected by the occurrence of a multiple twin birth [sic], since they 
were going to have more than two children either way. On the other hand, some 
families are happy with only two children. The latter group is forced to increase 
family size from two to three when the stork delivers twins. The one-third-of-a-child 
twins differential in family size reflects a difference in probabilities: the likelihood of 
having a third child increases from about .7 with a singleton second birth to a 
certainty when the second birth is multiple”. 
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